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03/17/83
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL

.From: Mark
Re:

New York v. Quarles,

This
fleeing

is

the

suspect,

case

No~Mar.

in which

subdued

him,

pol ice officer

discovered an

and asked him -- prior
I

the

captured a

emp~g ~ ,

~rni~~ where

g~

the

was.

have done some thinking about t hi s Pe tition, and present the

following for your consideration.
As I

indicated in my annotation of the pool memo,

I

think

the result here is outrageous -- but it also seems to follow logically from the prophylactic rule of Miranda.
case

law,

I

Onder the prior

do not think the dec is ion below is clearly wrong,

i.e., I do not see any clear basis for a summary reversal.
That does not mean, of course, that the result must be accepted.

It seems to me there are two possible theories on which

a contrary result could be reached:
(1) THERE WAS NO MIRANDA VIOLATION.
On this view, a police officer who has just captured a fleeing person is not required to give Miranda warnings until he is
certain that his and the public's s

ensured.

Thus, here

it was reasonable for the officer to ask about the gun, if not to
protect

himself

(the criminal was already handcuffed),

then to

protect bystanders from the danger of a loaded weapon.
A couple of points may be made about this theory.

.First, it

suggests that the duty to give Miranda warnings may depend on the

.·'

2

nature of the information sought.

0

If "danger" is the key, then

the officer may be limited to asking about weapons, as opposed to
asking about the whereabouts of stolen property.

(One might won-

der where abandoned drugs would fit in.)

Second,

there is some

problem

not

followed

in

suggesting

that

Miranda

need

though there was no imminent danger.

be

even

Here, it was reasonable for

the officer to want to find the gun;

but it is not clear that

this desire was so urgent that he could not take a few seconds to
give the Miranda warnings.

(Contrast a

situation in which the

officer subdued this person in a crowded bar, and then found the
empty holster; the officer reasonably would feel that he remained
in danger while a weapon was somewhere in the crowd.)

Finally,

what would happen if the suspect refused to answer, and asserted
his Miranda rights?

If the holding is that it is not a Miranda

violation to ask about the gun, then presumably the officer could
continue to pressure the suspect for information despite the refusal to speak.
(2) THERE WAS A MIRANDA VIOLATION, BUT THE EVIDENCE NEED NOT
BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE NO IMPORTANT RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED.
On

this

view,

the

officer

should

have

read

the

Miranda

warnings, because the person was in custody and presented no danger

to the officers.

violated,

however,

The mere fact

does not necessarily require

all resulting evidence.
"self-incrimination"
over,

suppression of

This situation differs from the type of

envisioned

by

the

Fifth Amendment.

More-

there is no doubt as to the reliability of the confession:

the gun was found.
,---_------------~-

1:•

that the Miranda rule was

Thus, even if the suspect's actual statement

l

3.

telling the officer the location of the gun might have to be suppressed,

----

~

gun

itself could be used.

This analysis

has ~

support in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 478 (1974), where Justice
Rehnquist

inquired as

to whether

the deterrent purpose of

the

Fifth Amendment exclusionary rule would be served by suppression
of completely reliable evidence obtained following

a

technical

violation of Miranda.
This view seems more consistent with prior Court reasoning
than the first view, which simply creates a certain type of "exigent circumstances" exception, and one that is difficult to define.

But it also is a potentially broader theory, as it calls

into question whether we really should have an inflexible prophylactic rule requiring suppression of all fruits of an interrogation that violates the Miranda rule.
If either of these theories interests you, then you should
vote to grant cert.

Otherwise, this is a just a fact-bound case

that applies prior law in a straightforward manner .

..

March 18, 1983, Conference
List 1, Sheet 2

~~4-

No. 82-1213-CSY

~~~t~4Jd~A.~

Cert to N.Y. Ct. Ap • {Cooke-, ~
Jones,
Fuchsberg,
Meyer;
Wachtler, Jasen, Gabrielli,
dissenting) {memorandum)
Af f i r min g N • Y • App • Di v • {order )
Affirming
N.Y.
Sup.
Ct.
{Ferraro)
qt. ~~ ~

New York

v.

Quarles

State/Criminal

1.

SUMMARY:

warnings,

petr

was

After
asked

exigent

circumstances

custody

before

he

arrest,
where

justify

receives

but before
the

the
his

gun

receiving Miranda

was.

questioning
Miranda

J/kz ~e}Y
Issues:
of

a

warnings?

1)

person
2)

do
in

must

.··

- 2 -

always be suppressed?

3) must evidence that would be discovered

inevitably be suppressed?
2.

On Sept.

THE FACTS:

11, 1980,

at 12:30 am,

police

officers Kraft and Scarring were approached in their patrol car
by a young woman who stated that she had been raped at gunpoint.
She gave the officers a detailed description of the assailant,
and said that he had gone into an A&P food store on Francis Lewis
Boulevard.

The officers put

the woman

into the patrol car,

called for backup units, and drove to the store.

As the backup

units arrived, Kraft stood in the doorway of the store.
resp,

who fit

the description,

He saw

approach the checkout counter.

When resp noticed Kraft, he turned and ran down the aisle toward
the back of the store.

Kraft gave chase, but lost sight of resp

as resp turned the corner.

When Kraft rounded the corner, he saw

resp two aisles away and ordered him to stop and put his hands
over his head.
guns

Resp complied, and as the other officers arrived

drawn, Kraft frisked

resp finding

an empty gun holster.

With several officers surrounding resp, Kraft reholstered his gun
and handcuffed resp's hands behind his back.
Kraft then asked resp where the gun was.

Resp answered,

"the gun is over there," motioning toward a stack of car tons.
Kraft reached into one carton and withdrew a load revolver.

He

placed resp under arrest and gave him his Miranda warnings.

He

then asked resp if he owned the
Kraft

asked where

Florida."
3.

...,.'..."'.

he

bought

gun~

resp replied, "yes."

the gun,

resp answered,

When

"Miami,

No further questioning occurred.
PROCEEDINGS

BELOW:

Resp

was

indicted

for

criminal

/

.·

- 3 -

possession

of

a

weapon

in

the

There

d~gree.

third

is

no

;,
indication from the papers whether he was ever charg ~ d with rape.

The

trial

court

suppressed

both

his

Justice Ferraro held that resp was

statements

and

the

gun.

in custody under Miranda v.

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966}, when the question was asked because
he had been handcuffed.
before

any

Resp was entitled to Miranda warnings

questioning.

He

distinguished

the

stop-and-frisk

cases because resp was in custody, and he distinguished a police
safety case,

People

v.

Chestnut,

denied, 449 U.S. 1018 (1981}

51

N.Y.2d

14

(1980},

cert.

(officer may question person without

Miranda warning to protect officer's safety}, on the ground that
"the officers
for Cert.

4a.

[sic]

safety was not in question."

App. to Pet.

The later statements elicited after the Miranda

warning were tainted by the prior questioning.
The Appellate Division affirmed without opinion.
4.
3 vote.
held

DECISION BELOW:

Without mentioning federal law explicitly, the majority

that,

exception
evidence

The Court of Appeals affirmed by a 4 to

even
to

in

assuming

the
the

there

pre-warning
record

circumstances posing

a

an

exigent

statement

before
risk

is

to

us

that

rule,

circumstances
"there

there

were

the public safety or

police interrogation was prompted by any such concern."
7a.

The

two

cases

People v. Huffman,

cited by the dissent
41 N.Y.2d 29

are

is

no

exigent
that the
Id., at

inapposite.

In

(1976}, the question "what are

you doing back here?" was a threshold

inquiry seeking general

information only, not a question calculated to elicit evidence of
criminal

activity

such

as

here.

In People

v.

Chestnut,

the

- ,. defendant had not been reduced to physical powerlesspess as here,
and the officers' question was prompted by a conce ~n for their
personal safety.
Justice Wachtler
Innis,

dissented.

Miranda and Rhode Island v.

446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980), are concerned with discouraging

official conduct
opposed

to

intended to elicit incriminating responses as

conduct

designed

noninvestigatory purposes.
intended

to

clarify a

themselves in.

to

achieve

legitimate,

The question in People v. Huffman was

confusing

situation

the officers

found

In People v. Chestnut, the officer observed the

defendants, one of whom was believed to be armed, pass a small
object between themselves prior to their apprehension.

With the

defendants lying on the ground at gunpoint, the one who received
the object was asked,

"where

is the gun?"

The fact

that the

officer in Chestnut believed himself in physical danger was not
the

basis

for

propriety of
frisk.

the

the

Moreover,

holding.

question as

The

holding

part of a

based

on

the

justifiable stop-and-

the existence of a loaded, lost gun in this

case posed a danger to the general public.

See United States v.

Castellana, 500 F.2d 325, 326-327 (CAS 1974)
fear of imminent harm not required).
gun to a hidden accomplice or dropped
child to pick up.

was

(en bane)

(officer's

Possibly, resp passed the
it in the street for a

Miranda was not intended to thwart official

attempts to protect public safety.
5.
solely

CONTENTIONS:
on

the

federal

Amendment context,

Petr contends 1) the decision below rests
Constitution.

2)

exigent circumstances

As

in

the

Fourth

justify questioning a

- 5
Severa~

person in custody absent Miranda warnings.
so extended

states have

,·~ere,

the exigent circumstances exception.

Kraft

reasonably believed that there was a gun in the supermarket.

To

require him to give a Miranda warning would subject him and the
public to unnecessary risks.

3) The Court has never determined

the extent to which a Miranda violation requires suppression of
physical evidence obtained derivatively.

u.s.

417

478

In Michigan v. Tucker,

(1964), the Court refused to suppress the testimony

of a witness who was discovered by use of a statement taken in
violation

of

Miranda.

The

Court

also

stated

that

when

the

statement was taken in good faith, the deterrent rationale of the
exclusionary rule lost much of its force.
acted

in

good

faith

here.

4)

The

Id.,

doctrine

at 447.
of

Kraft

inevitable

discovery, recognized by several circuits, prevents exclusion of
the gun.
Resp contends 1) the courts below found as a factual matter
that

no exigent circumstances existed.

The question asked of

resp was custodial interrogation as defined
Rhode Island v. Innis.
has

in Miranda and

The New York Court of Appeals in Chestnut

recognized the exception asked for by petr.

only the factual findings in this case.
fruit

from

involved

the

an

improper

interrogation

decision.

The

under

prior

the

(1964),

and

safeguards.

~·

.

Court

that

rule
the

·-Here,

in

2) The gun was tainted

interrogation.
that

found

occurred

that

the

of Escobedo
police

had

v.

Petr disputes

Michigan
prior

to

v.

Tucker

the Miranda

interrogation was proper
Illinois,

378

u.s.

478

complied with constitutional

resp received no prior warning at all.

3)

-

u

-

doct~ine

Petr did not present the inevitable discovery

argument

in the trial court; under New York law, t~e issue ~~ s therefore
not

properly

preserved

for

appellate

review.

The

appellate

courts did not address the issue.
6.

DISCUSSION:

violation.

The questioning of resp was a clear Mirand

Petr asks for an exigent circumstances exception to

the requirement of Miranda warnings.
the

New

York

Court

of

Appeals

exception in Chestnut.

It appears, however, that

recognized

precisely

such

an

Petr in effect is complaining that Kraft

really did believe that public safety and his own person were in
danger.

The lower courts expressly rejected this factual claim.

In United States v. Castellana, FBI agents while executing a
search

warrant

led

agents

believed

the

money

defendant
was

into a back

secreted.

They

room where

expected

that

the
the

defendant would count and verify the money once it was found.
They had no information that the defendant possessed guns.
agent

asked

the

defendant

whether

he

had

any

weapons

reach, and he admitted that there were guns in the desk.

An

within
The CAS

held that the question was a security measure justified by Terry
v.

Ohio,

392

u.s.

1

(1968),

and

constitute a Miranda interrogation.
a conflict.

that

the

question

did

not

Castellana does not present

The defendant there, unlike resp here, was not held

at gunpoint or handcuffed and easily could have reached into the
desk and jeopardized the officers' safety.
Michigan

v.

Tucker,

a pre-Miranda case,

is

inapplicable.

"'?

Moreover, it is difficult to see how the officer's question here ~ ~
was in good faith.

The resp was immobilized, and the officers

- 7 had control of the area.
question
Finally,

other

than

although

to

There was no other purpose for
elicit

an

incriminating

the availability of the

the

,·~ admission.

inevitable discovery

doctrine has not been settled by this Court, the New York courts
i

did

not

address

the

issue,

most

likely

due

to

the

state

procedural bar.
7.

RECOMMENDATION:

I recommend denial.

There is a response.

March 2, 1983

Van Zandt

opn in petn
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NEW YORK v. BENJAMIN QUARLES
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF
APPEALS OF NEW YORK
Decided May-, 1983

JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting from denial of certiorari.
Shortly after midnight on September 11, 1980, two New
York police officers were on road patrol in the borough of
Queens when a young woman approached them and requested assistance. She stated that she had just been raped
by a man whom she described. She indicated that her assailant had a gun, and that he had gone into a nearby A&P supermarket. The ensuing facts, apparently undisputed, are
chronicled in Judge Wachtler's dissenting opinion in the New
York Court of Appeals:
"The officers drove the woman to the supermarket
where Kraft approached the front of the store on foot
while Scarring radioed for assistance. Kraft then observed the defendant, who matched the description
given by the woman, approaching the checkout counter.
Defendant then fled to the rear of the store with Kraft,
who lost sight of the defendant for several seconds, in
pursuit. Kraft told defendant to stop and put his hands
over his head. Other officers who had arrived in the interim surrounded defendant while Kraft frisked him,
discovering an empty shoulder holster.
Kraft handcuffed defendant's hands behind his back
and asked him where the gun was. The defendant
looked in the direction of a stack of cartons and responded "the gun is over there". The gun was not visible but Kraft reached into one of the cartons and retrieved a loaded revolver. He placed defe ant under
arrest and advised him of his Miranda 'ghts. Kraft

~'~ v:f~f n:;:
~~fv

~

i9 1983

/,;I.;

Circulated:
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NEW YORK v. QUARLES

then asked defendant if he owned the revolver and received an affirmative reply. In response to another
question posed by Kraft defendant indicated that he purchased the weapon in Miami, Florida." Petn. 9a-10a
When the state sought to use the gun and the statements
made by the defendant in criminal proceedings against him,
the trial court and later the appellate courts of New York
held that this Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U. S. 436 (1966) required exclusion of the evidence. This result-all but impossible to justify, I submit, to any thoughtful
person not schooled in the arcane niceties of 20th century
American Constitutional law-rests on a plausible but not an
inevitable reading of our Miranda decision. Being convinced that there is another equally plausible interpretation
of the Miranda doctrine which would allow the state to use
this highly relevant evidence, I dissent from this Court's refusal to grant the state's petition for certiorari.
The Court's decision in Miranda was principally concerned
with the "inherent compulsions of the interrogation process"
that were seen to arise when a criminal defendant was "questioned by police officers, detectives, or a prosecuting attorney in a room in which he was cut off from the outside world"
and subjected to deliberate governmental intimidation that
was "destructive of human dignity." 384 U. 8., at 445, 457,
467. The Court, however, laid down a series of prophylactic
rules that would apply even in situations not squarely presenting the evils of coercion and unreliability at which the
opinion was directed. Thus, the Court held that the
Miranda safeguards would be applicable to any "interrogation" occurring after "a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way." Id., at 444.
The usefulness of the Miranda rules is two-fold. First, as
can be attested by anyone who has watched television shows
in which the police apprehend a suspect, the rules have discouraged application of "third degree" interrogation techniques. In this sense the rules have undoubtedly accom-

NEW YORK v. QUARLES

plished one of their major goals. Second, the Miranda
safeguards have avoided the necessity of individualized inquiry as to whether psychological coercion has been used
against particular defendants.
In keeping with this latter purpose, decisions rendered by
this Court in the seventeen years since Miranda was announced demonstrate a concern that the decision's prophylactic rules be clearcut and easily applied. Thus, in part from
this desire to maintain a fixed, clear-cut framework of rules,
we have in several contexts refused to expand the language
of Miranda, see Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492, 495
(1977); United States v. Mandujano, 425 U. S. 564 (1976);
Fare v. Michael C., 442 U. S. 707 (1979). Nonetheless, our
decisions also have evidenced a recognition that additions to
or subtractions from the general language of Miranda will be
accepted when other important interests of the criminal justice system would be jeopardized by a completely wooden
application of that case. In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S.
477 (1982), we devised a new prophylactic rule to prevent the
badgering of an accused who indicates a desire to communicate only through a lawyer. On the other hand, in Harris v.
New York, 401 U. S. 222 (1971) and Oregon v. Haas, 420
U. S. 714 (1975) the Court held that statements obtained in
violation of Miranda safeguards can be used to impeach a defendant's testimony on direct examination. Likewise, in
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433 (1974), we refused to suppress the testimony of a witness discovered as a result of a
Miranda violation; we concluded that the deterrent value of
suppression of this testimony simply could not justify the
costs flowing from exclusion of plainly reliable and highly
probative evidence, and accordingly, refused to apply
Miranda in the literal fashion urged by the defendant.
Viewed against this background, the state's request in this
case that we consider adopting an "exigent circumstances"
limitation on the literal sweep of Miranda's language is entitled to careful consideration. If there ever are to be "exigent circumstances" justifying a refusal to exclude evidence
because of a technical Miranda violation, the circumstances

4
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of this case would seem to be as likely a candidate as any.
Officer Kraft entered the supermarket on foot while his partner radioed for assistance; he immediately observed the defendant, who matched the description given by the rape victim, approaching the checkout counter. When the defendant
fled to the rear of the supermarket, Kraft followed in hot pursuit with his weapon drawn. Other officers meanwhile arrived and surrounded the defendant while Kraft frisked him,
discovering an empty shoulder holster. At that point, Kraft
handcuffed the defendant and asked him where he had put his
gun.
To say that in the very process of disarming and handcuffing a fleeing felon an officer must pull out his "Miranda card"
and recite the familiar warnings written there before asking
the defendant the natural, almost instinctive question where
he has hidden his gun-that only a moment ago was in his
now-empty shoulder holster-would subject the law to welldeserved ridicule. Exclusionary rules such as that imposed
by our Miranda decision have been criticized because they
permit "the criminal to go free because the constable has
blundered." However one may regard this criticism, surely
no thinking person can maintain that the "constable" in this
case "blundered" by asking the single question he did-while
in the very process of converting the status of the defendant
from "in flight" to "in custody." Just as the normal requirement of Fourth Amendment law is that a warrant be secured,
the requirement of Miranda is that the warnings be given
whenever an accused is in custody before "interrogation" occur. But just as "exigent circumstances" provide an exception to the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment, "exigent circumstances" should provide a limited
exception to the application of the Miranda rule in all its
rigor, at least during the brief moments when an armed, fleeing defendant is being reduced to custody.
The majority of the New York Court of Appeals did not
rule out the possibility of some such exception, but stated
that if there were such an exception it would depend on the
subjective purpose of the police officer asking the question.

NEW YORK v. QUARLES

It apparently believed that the exigent circumstances exception could not be applied absent affirmative testimony that
the purpose of Kraft's inquiry had been to locate and to confiscate the defendant's gun for the protection of the public,
rather than to obtain evidence of criminal activity on the part
of the defendant. Because the trial court had made no finding as to the subjective motivation of the officers, the New
York Court of Appeals declined to consider the question.
It would be profitless, it seems to me, to hold that an "exigent circumstances" exception to the Miranda rule depends
on post hoc findings as to the subjective motivation of particular police officers. Such a rule would run counter to the
theme of clear-cut, easily applied rules which has characterized our post-Miranda decisions, see p. - - , supra. It
would make little sense to have rules designed to achieve
generalized deterrent effect, see Michigan v. Tucker, supra,
417 U. 8., at 447, turn on the question whether an individual
officer in a particular case experienced one type of mental
concern rather than another. As JUSTICE WHITE has written in a related context, "sending state and federal courts on
an expedition into the minds of police officers would produce
a grave and fruitless misallocation of judicial resources."
Massachusetts v. Painten, 389 U. S. 560, 565 (1968) (WHITE,
J., dissenting from dismissal of writ of certiorari as improvidently granted).
Inquiry into the subjective motivation prompting an officer
to ask questions of a defendant seems predestined to failure.
Most police officers placed in the situation occupied by Officer
Kraft undoubtedly would be concerned in part for their own
safety, in part for the safety of others, and in part, perhaps,
with the desirability of obtaining evidence against the accused. In this case the question "Where is the gun?" no
doubt flowed instinctively from the nature of the situation
and the nature of the work, without any very clear motivation as to why it is asked, and elaborate inquiries into such
motivation would be as difficult as they would be pointless.
And even if we were confident that clearcut determinations
regarding intent were possible, a suppression hearing would

:,
6

NEW YORK v. QUARLES

''!

scarcely provide the most likely forum for making such
findings.
Ten years ago in United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218
(1973), we held that the "search incident to arrest" exception
to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment should
not be made to depend on the subjective state of mind of each
arresting officer, as later determined at a judicial suppression
hearing. We said, "it is of no moment that [the police officer] did not indicate any subjective fear of the respondent .... " !d., at 236. Likewise, again in the Fourth
Amendment context, we have said "[s]ubjective intent alone
... does not make otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional." Scott v. United States, 436 U. S. 128, 136
(1978). For the reasons advanced in Robinson and Scott, as
well as above, an "exigent circumstances" exception to the
Miranda rule should not be made to depend upon the existence of some particular motivation in a particular arresting
officer. They should instead turn on objective considerations relating to the circumstances in which the officer
acted. The justification for the narrow "exigent circumstances" exception called to mind by the facts of this case is
that police officers will almost invariably find it necessary to
apprehend and subdue a defendant before reading him his
Miranda rights, and, during these brief moments, questions
of the sort asked here will almost inevitably be put to the suspect. The answers received obviously do not suffer from the
unreliability that the Miranda rules were designed to prevent, and their suppression is unlikely to have any appreciable effect on official conduct. Accordingly, I would grant the
petition for a writ of certiorari.
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MEMO TO FILE
An

interesting Miranda

question,

but

enforcement.

one

of

case

that

considerable

presents

a novel

importance

Shortly after midnight,

to

law

a cruising patrol

car was stoppped by a woman who said she had been raped,
and

that

the

raper

him

by a

identified

yellow letters.
the

officer

had

entered

teeshirt with

an

A&P

"Big

store.

Ben"

on

She
it

After calling for reinforcements, one of
Kraft

within the store.

identified

respondent

who

fled

Officer Kraft caught him, was joined by

three or four other officers.

The New York Courts found

the facts, critical to this decision, as follows:
"Police officers surrounded the defendant
and Officer Kraft ••• frisked him and discovered
an
empty
shoulder
holster.
Kraft
then
handcuffed defendant hands behind his back.
Kraft then asked the defendant where the gun
was. The defendant looked in the direction of a
stack of cartons and said 'the gun is over
there'.
The gun was not in sight but Kraft
reached into a liquid soap carton and found a
loaded revolver.
He placed defendant under
arrest and read the proper Miranda warnings to
him.
He then asked the defendant if he owned
the gun.
The defendant replied 'yes'.
(Pet.
3A) •

in

L..

~I

•'j
'

The New York Courts suppressed both the gun and the
statement that respondent owned it.
decision below was

simple:

The rationale of the

Respondent was "in custody"

in the sense that he was not free to leave, and therefore
the

question

as

interrogation.

to

"where

is

the

gun"

was

custodial

Although defendant had been given Miranda

warnings before he admitted the gun was his own, this was
held to be a "fruit" of the custodial questioning.
The case presents two questions:
question:

"Where

the

is

gun?"

(i) Whether Kraft's
violated

Miranda's

commands?, and (ii) If so, whether the revolver itself and
the

\

defendant's

admission

of

ownership,

elicited

after .

Miranda warnings, were fruits of the initial violation?
INCIDENT TO ARREST
The

SG

argues

that

arrest"

questions

are

not

that

clearly

are

the

rationale

of

"incident

to

within

Miranda.

It is not denied that respondent was in custody

in the sense that he could not have departed.
subjected
sense?
never

to

The

"custodial
SG

argues

contemplated

this

interrogation"

rather
type

in

persuasively
of

situation.

But was he
the

Miranda

that Miranda
Typically,

custodial interrogation takes place in the station house
and often lasts for hours.

,.

The process involves the use

,,

3.

by officers of
Even

in

a

established

situation

such

techniques of
Royer

(airport

interrogation.
seizure) ,

the

suspect had been taken to a private room by two officers
for

the purpose of

interrogation in a custodial setting

nor unlike a station house.

The SG argues:

"Arresting a suspect is a discrete process,
relatively easy to distinguish from subsequent
efforts to gather testimonial evidence from the
suspect.
When questions
are
asked
as
a
legitimate part of the process of completing an
arrest, the dangers of coercion with which
Miranda was concerned ordinarily are not likely
to be present".
(Br. 9, 13)
The State of New York's brief relies primarily what
it says are state and lower federal court cases holding .
that

at

the

time

of

arrest

officers

may

ask

about

"weapons" where, as here, there was probable cause (after
the shoulder holster had been found)
was near

by.

to believe a weapon

The New York courts noted,

however,

that

there was no danger here to the officers since he had been
handcuffed.

One answer to this might be that officers had

a duty to locate a suspected weapon because of danger to
other people,

Here, a fully loaded revolver had been put

in a carton on a shelf in an A&P store, and could have
been a real danger.

4.

I have not read any of the cases relied upon by the
State.

They are cited on pages 13 - 15 of its blue brief.

Was the revolver a "fruit"
The second, less interesting question, is whether the
revolver

discovered

after

and

~M~i~r~a~n~d~a~~warnings,

respondent's admission of ownership at that time, properly
were suppressed by the New York Courts.
The State and the SG rely on Michigan v. Tucker.

The

SG states that this Court has "not resolved the question
whether non-testimonial fruits of a Miranda violation may
be

used

as

evidence."

It

is

argued

that

the

Self-

Incrimination Clause applies only to compelled statements,
not to non-testimonial evidence.

Moreover, both the State

and the SG rely on the "inevitably discovery" rule.
Respondent

has

filed

quite

an

effective

particularly on the custodial interrogation issue.

brief,
There

is a great deal of language in our cases to the effect
that once a suspect is in custody, Miranda warnings must
be

Respondent

given.

also

distinguishes

Michigan

v.

"incident

to

Tucker.

*
The
arrest"

government
are

"on

argues
the

*
that

scene

*
questions

questioning

as

to

facts

''·•

'.

~.

surrounding a crime", and are not custodial in the sense
that concerned the Miranda Court.

I would like to accept

this argument, as it makes a great deal of sense.
argues

that

the

societal

costs,

in

terms

The SG
of

law

enforcement, are substantial as on the scene questioning
often contributes to the solution of crimes.
general sense,
res gesti

this type of questioning is analogous to

statements.

excitement

of

In a very

making

Here the police officer,
an

arrest

and

finding

in

an

the

empty

shoulder holster, asked the most natural question in the
world:

where is the gun?

It simply makes little sense to

equate this with the custodial interrogation that Miranda
was

concerned

about.

The

difficulty,

as

the

SG

recognizes, is that a rule with respect to "on the scene"
questioning would have to be applied on a case by case
basis.

But

this

is

not

an

unfamiliar

particularly in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
LFP, JR

situation,

/~

/fT¥-

rp-oz;;JC.._ ,_,_
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(Argument Date January 18, 1984)
Cammie R. Robinson

New York v. Quarles

January 12, 1984

Questions Presented

1. Whether the question "Where is the gun?" by a police
officer during the course of arrest requires Miranda warnings.

2. If so, whether the subsequent discovery of the gun
and the confession by defendant, after being read his Miranda
rights, that the gun was his are inadmissible as fruits of the
poison tree, or whether they are admissible because of a good
faith exception or the rule of inevitable discovery.

I. FACTS & DECISIONS BELOW

'

'I

Patrolling police were notified that a man matching
respondent's description had just committed armed rape.
Kraft spotted respondent in an A&P and gave chase.

Officer

He lost sight

of respondent for 15-20 seconds but soon caught up with him.
that time, at least four other officers were on the scene.
all surrounded respondent with guns drawn.

By
They

Respondent

surrendered with arms above his head and Officer Kraft
immediately frisked and handcuffed him.

The pat down revealed an

empty shoulder holster, whereupon Officer Kraft asked: "Where is
the gun?"

Respondent pointed to some cartons in the store and

said: "The gun is over there."

The question was asked before

respondent was read his Miranda rights.

The gun was found

immediately, respondent was read his Miranda rights, and then
confessed that the gun was his and that he had bought it in
Miami, Florida.
Respondent was charged with illegal possession of a
firearm.l

Before trial, he moved to suppress the gun and his

confession of ownership on the ground that his Miranda rights
were violated and that the evidence was "fruit of the poison
tree."

The TC found that the question "Where is the gun?"

constituted "custodial interrogation" requiring Miranda warnings.
Because these were not given, the TC suppressed the response to
1 Respondent was intially charged with armed rape as well, but
that charge was dropped.

the question, gun, and the statement of

own~rship.

.,

T~e

Appellate

Division affirmed without opinion and the Court of Appeals of New
York affirmed with one judge dissenting.

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Rule of Miranda

In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966}, this Court
announced a prophylactic rule to avoid the possibility that
suspects taken into custody would be coerced into incriminating
statements in violation of the 5th Amendment.

As interpreted and

applied over the last 17 years, the rule is simple and absolute:
Once a suspect is taken into custody, police may not interrogate
him without first providing Miranda warnings.

Responses to any

interrogation conducted without such warnings may not be used in
the government's case in chief.

This rule provides a clearcut

guideline for police and courts and avoids the necessity of a
case-by-case inquiry into the existence of coercion.

Courts need

only make two determinations in resolving a Miranda issue: (1}
Was the suspect in custody? and (2} Was he subject to
interrogation?
leave.

A suspect is in custody if he is not free to

Miranda, 384

u.s.,

at 4778.

Questioning requiring

Miranda warnings occurs whenever police ask a question that they
reasonably should expect will elicit an incriminating response.
See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446

u.s.

291, 302 (1980} .2

Footnote(s} 2 will appear on following pages.

The State concedes that respondent 'was in
the time of the challenged quesion.
The SG does not.

"cu~tody"

at

'I

See State's Brief', at 11.

He attempts to define "custody" differently for

Miranda purposes than for 4th Amendment purposes:
It is true that respondent was in custody in the sense
that he had been seized within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, but the Fourth Amendment seizure
should not be equated with "custody" as Miranda uses
that term. A Fourth Amendment seizure, while a
necessary condition of requiring Miranda warnings, is
not a sufficient reason to require warnings. SG's
Brief, at 5.
The SG claims that custody "incident to arrest" is not custody
within the meaning of Miranda because Miranda was concerned with
custody that was likely to compel suspects to speak and custody
incident to arrest is not.

The SG's definition of "custody"

~

not consistent with the everyday use of the term and is vague and
provi.des little guidance.

-----not suggest, of course,

See,

~,

SG's Brief, at 9 ("We do

that all questions asked at the scene of

an arrest should be regarded as incident to the arrest.").
The State argues that although respondent was in
"custody," the challenged question did not constitute "custodial
interrogation" within the meaning of Miranda.

See State's Brief,

at 10 (where defendant is "asked a single question, in a public
place, for the protection of everyone in the vicinity, and this

2Routine administrative questions necessary to process an
arrest have been held not to require Miranda warnings. See,
~, United States ex rel. Hines v. La Vallee, 521 F.2d 1109
(CA2 1975), cert. denied, 423 u.s. 1090 (1976) ("exception is
limited to simple indentification information of the most basic
sort (e.g., name, address, marital status).") .

.

..

?

question led to objective evidence (the gun}" there
"custodial interrogation"}.

i~

no

''I

The State argues that thfs Court

already has recognized in Innis that not all questions constitute
interrogation within the meaning of Miranda.

Citing 446

u.s.,

at

302 (questions that are not reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response do not require Miranda warnings}.

It

argues that this Court also should exempt "general on the scene
questioning" from

the rule of Miranda.

States Brief, at 10-12.

It claims support for this exception in Miranda itself.

The

State argues that Miranda distinguished between stationhouse
questioning and "general on-the-scene questioning as to facts
surrounding a crime."

Miranda, 384

u.s.,

at 477.

Although the

quoted language is found in Miranda, it is taken entirely out of ~

-

context.

The full quote distinguishes between questioning the

s uspect in custody and questioning other witnesses:
When an individual is in custody ••• , the police may,
of course, seek out evidence in the field to be used at
trial against him. Such investigation may include
inquiry of persons not under restraint. General onthe-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime
or other general questioning of citizens in the factfinding process is not affected by our holding. It is
an act of responsible citizenship for individuals to
give whatever information they may have to aid in law
enforcement. 384 U.S., at 477-478 (emphasis added}.
The State's attempt to redefine "interrogation" suffers from the
same problems as the SG's efforts on behalf of the term
"custody": the definition does not conform with everyday use and
provides no clear guidance to police.
The argument of both the State and the SG rest on the
same premise: Miranda was concerned with the kind of "custodial
interrogation" that commonly occurs at the stationhouse when the

~ay

suspect is cut off from the outside world, and police

employ

'\

the "third degree" in conducting their interrogation without fear
of detection.

They argue that because the evils that motivated

Miranda are not present here, there is no need for its
prophylactic rules.
Miranda.

There is some support for this position in

The Court explained the importance of the factual

background leading to its decision:
In each [of the four cases] , the defendant was
questioned by police officers [or some other official]
in a room in which he was cut off from the outside
world.
They all thus share salient features i~communicado interrogation of individuals ip a policedominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating
statements without full warinings of constitutional
rights . . • . . An understanding of the nature and setting
of this in-custody interrogation is essential to our
decision today. 384 u.s., at 445.
Nevertheless, subsequent decisions by this Court seem to
foreclose the argument that stationhouse interrogation of the
type described in Miranda is the only questioning that requires
Miranda warnings.

In Orozco v. Texas, 394

u.s.

324 (1969),

Miranda warinings were required even though the suspect was
questioned immediately on his arrest and in the familiar
surroundings of his bedroom.

The Court expressly rejected the

argument that stationhouse questioning of the type described in
Miranda was the only
at 327.

ty~e

requirjng Miranda

w~ngs.

394 U.S.,

Orozco virtually forecloses the SG's argument that

questions "incident to arrest" are not subject to the Miranda
rule.

There police asked the suspect two questions relevant

here: (1) Do you own a

pistol?~

and, (2) Where is the pistol now?

The answers to both questions were held to be inadmissible under
Miranda.

.

B. Exigency Exception

'I

.I

The State's better argument is based on an exigency
exception.

It claims, quite reasonably, that the question "Where

is the gun?" under the facts of this case was justified by a
legitimate concern for the safety of the arresting officers and
the public.

Requiring Miranda warnings regardless of exigent

circumstances is ridiculous.

Assume police get a reliable tip

that a suspect plans to plant a bomb in the Capitol that is
scheduled to go off at 2:07 p.m.

They apprehend the suspect in

the building at 2:06 p.m. without the bomb.
"Where's the bomb?"
of here!"

Police yell at him:

He resonds: "It's over there.

Let's get out

A subsequent judicial determination that the question

violated Miranda, "would subject the law to well-deserved
ridicule."

New York v. Quarles, No. 82-1213 (JUSTICE REHNQUIST

dissenting from denial).
Respondent replies that even if an exigency exception
is appropriate in theory, it is not appropriate in this case.

;.q~f

He ~

correctly points out that the state court expressly found that at
the time of the question respondent posed no threat to officer

~

~
~

~·~

safety and that there was no evidence in the record from which it
could find exigent circumstances posing any risk to public
safety.

Cert. Pet. at 7a.

Respondent has a strong argument if

the exigency exception requires a factual predicate.

I do not

believe that it should.
The beauty of the Miranda rule is that it is relatively
simple and absolute.

Before announcing its decision, the Court

~-

looked at all the factors generally applicable to custbdial

'l

interrogations and determined, on balance, that a flat
requirement that Miranda warnings be given before any question is
asked of a suspect in custody protected the individual's 5th
Amendment rights without placing too great a burden on society's
interest in criminal investigation.

Once that balance was struck

in Miranda, there was no need for a case-by-case inquiry into the
existence of coercion.

There was only a two-pronged objective

test - was the suspect in custody and was he questioned.
Exceptions to this simple rule that require additional case-bycase determinations destroy its simplicity and threaten to
confuse police and the courts.

Instead of requiring the police

to determine the existence of an emergency, it seems better to
...............
...
'
,____........
announce a narrow per se exception: On apprehending a suspect,

-.,..._-----

-- -

'"'"""'--"

police may inquire immediately into the location of any weapon
explosive without first giving Miranda warnings.

Thus, single

questions such as "Where is the gun?" or "Where is the bomb?"
permissible.

I agree with the State that these questions are

necessary to protect the police and the public and are no more
intrusive than a pat down.3

Because the question challenged her

fits that narrow exception, I recommend that the Court reverse.

C. Derivative Evidence and Inevitable Discovery

3A pat down, of course, does not pose any 5th Amendment
problems since it does not involve self-incrimination.

If the Court concludes that the challenged

''l

violated respondent's Miranda rights, it must
any, evidence must be excluded as a result.
respondent's response "It's over there" is

qu~stion

determin~

what, if

~-

It is clear that
inadmissible~

It

not clear whether the gun, which was discovered as a result

is ~
of ~

that response, or respondent's subsequent confession to
ownership, which was made after Miranda warnings had been given,
are inadmissible.

The State and the SG advance two theories to

support their claims that the challenged evidence should be
admissible despite any Miranda violation: 4 (1) evidence obtained
derivatively from a good faith violation of Miranda need not be
excluded; and, (2) evidence that would have been discovered
"inevitably" need not be excluded.

(s-~
1. Derivative Evidence -

'f-tH-J-~U,'~~)

The ~~ SG

argue that fruits

(or at least non-testimonial fruits) of a good faith Miranda
violation should not be subject to the exclusionary rule.

This

Court has not determined whether such derivative evidence must be
excluded, but language in Miranda suggests that it generally
should: absent Miranda warnings, "no evidence obtained as a
result of interrogation can be used against [defendant]."

u.s.,

at 479. 5

384

Whatever merit a good faith exception may have in

4The State argues that both the gun and the confession of
ownership are admissible regardless of any Miranda violation.
The SG argues only that the gun is admissible.
5This is not completely true. In Harris v. New York, 401 U.S.
222 (1971), the Court held that statements obtained in violation
Footnote continued on next page.

theory, this is not the case to apply it.

Under curr~~t law,

'I

Miranda warnings must be given before police ask any nonadministrative question of a suspect in custody.

Respondent here

was in custody and was asked a non-administrative question prior
to Miranda warnings.

If the Court is not going to recognize an

exigency exception, it also should not provide a good faith
exception to police who violate Miranda's clear dictates 17 years
after its announcement.
Both the State and the SG rely on this Court's decision
in Michigan v. Tucker, 417

u.s.

433 (1974), in urging application
/'~~
of a good faith exception here. I believe that Tucker is
~~
distinguishable.

In that case, defendant was arrested for rape

before Miranda had been decided.

The police advised defendant

that he need not have answer any questions, told him that any
answers could be used against him, asked him whether he wanted an
attorney, and inquired as to whether he understood his
constitutional rights.

They did not tell him that he could have

an attorney appointed if he could not afford one.

Defendant

answered that he understood his rights, that he did not want an
attorney, and that he was willing to answer questions.

He told

police that at the time of the alleged rape he had been with a
third party and that he later left and went horne to bed.

The

police contacted the third party whose story did not conform with

of Miranda may be used to impeach the defendant's credibility if
he testifies at trial. The Court reasoned that such use of
evidence would not affect deterrence.

,.

defendant's but rather tended to incriminat~ him.
excluded that witnesses testimony.

This Court

Th~

TC

'1

reverse~

for

several reasons: (1) there had been no actual coercion and thus
no actual 5th Amendment

violation~

(2) although there had been a

technical violation of Miranda because police had not informed
defendant that he could be appointed counsel, this was
understandable in view of the fact that Miranda had not yet been
decided.

u.s.,

The Court found the second reason "significant."

at 447.

It does not exist here.

417

It would undercut Miranda

significantly to hold that 17 years after the decision,
derivative evidence need not be excluded if there is no actual
coercion.

The whole purpose of Miranda was to avoid the need to t~

a

determine coercion on a case-by-case approach. 6

2. Inevitable Discovery - The State and the SG argue that the gun
should not be excluded because it inevitably would have been
discovered on independent evidence.

This Court has never

-

---

expressly endorsed the inevitable discovery doctrine, but will

---------------------

,_

consider the issue in Nix v. Williams, No. 82-1651.
not endorse the doctrine in this case.

It should

Once police have

6There are other distinctions. Most significantly,
admissiblility of a gun discovered as a direct result of a
Miranda violation is different from admitting evidence of a
witness discovered from such a violation. It is not discovery of
the witness that is the relevant evidence - it is the witness's
testimony. Where, as in Tucker, neither the police nor the
defendant controlled the witness's testimony, the link to the
Miranda violation is attenuated. Not so with discovery of a gun
in a case charging illegal possesion of firearms.

·~·.

,·

..

'

4UJ~

committed a Miranda violation, they should have the

~~

b~ 'f den ~

demonstrating that evidence found because of that violation
inevitably would have been discovered by independent evidence.
There has not even been an attempt to make such a showing here. 7

III. CONCLUSION

I recommend that the Court announce a narrow per se rule
that arresting officers may ask a suspect whom they have just
taken into custody the whereabouts of any weapons or explosives
without first giving Miranda warnings.
should reverse the decision below.

On this narrow rule, it

Absent this rule, the

challenged question violated Miranda, and both the response to
the question and all evidence discovered because of it should be
excluded.

This case does not present a good situation to apply

the good faith exception or the inevitable discovery doctrine.

ADDENDUM

The State cites cases that generally indicated that many
states have applied the kind of exception to Miranda urged here.
The strongest of these are:
7Respondent also argues that the issue is foreclosed by the
state's preclusion rule. It was not raised at the hearing
suppression and under state law it may not be raised on appeal.
Because I believe that the State has not even attempted to meet
its burden of proof on this issue, I have not investigated this
issue.

(1) State v. Lane, 467 P.2d 304 (Wash. 1970) - Defendants

'I

robbed a grocery store at gunpoint.

A few days later, police

"crashed" defendants apartment and found them there.

One officer

interrupted another's recitation of Miranda to ask: "Do you have
the gun?"

This elicited an incriminating response.

Held:

Defendant was in custody at the time of the question, but there
was no Miranda violation because the question was motivated by
safety concerns.

The court cited the case of State v. Hayes, 439

P.2d 978 (1968), where a defendant had been arrested, handcuffed,
and was being led to the paddywagon when he pulled a gun and
fired at the officer.
(2) People v. Mullins, 532 P.2d 733 (Colorado 1975) - Police
arrived to find defendant standing over a man who had just been
shot.

There was another person present.

warnings, they asked "Where is the gun?"
incriminating response.

Before giving Miranda
This elicited an

Held: No Miranda violation because the

question was motivated by safety concerns.

"The actions of the

----~-------------police in attempting
to locate the weapon, in order to protect
themselves and the public, was entirely reasonable."

Id., at

735.
(3) Pope v. State, 478 P.2d 801 (Alaska 1971) - Police
arrested defendant minutes after a shooting.

As the officer was

conducting a pat down, he asked defendant if he had a gun.
Defendant responded that he did and that it was in the car.
Held: No Miranda violation because the question was prompted by
legitimate safety concerns.

'
(4) Ballew v. State, 441 S.W.2d 453 (Ark.
1969) -

r~Pol ice

'I

apprehended defendants as the were running from a shot'g un
killing.

As defendants approached police with hands raised,

police asked: "Where is the shotgun?"
incriminating response.

This elicited an

Held: No Miranda violation because the

question was motivated by safety concerns.
(5) State v. Levy, 292 So.2d 220 (La. 1974) - Defendant shot

--------

her husband in a bar and then went out to the parking lot and sat
in her car until police arrived.

An officer approached the car

and asked: "Is that your husband in " there?"
it was and that she had shot him.

She responded that

The officer then told her to

get out and asked "Where is the gun?"

Held: No Miranda violation

because the question was motivated by safety concerns.
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NEW YORK v. BENJAMIN QUARLES
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
OFNEWYORK
[February -

j;.b)~ ,£,v

, 1984]

JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent Benjamin Quarles was charged in the New
_pff~
York trial court with criminal possession of a weapon. The
trial court suppressed the gun in question, and a statement
made by respondent, because the statement was obtained by
police before they read respondent his "Miranda rights."
, .
That ruling was affirmed on appeal through the New York
1
~ .I
~
Court of Appeals. We granted certiorari, - - U. S. - rll"~ .J~;' }rtt- 103 S. Ct. 2118 (1983), and we now reverse. We conclud'
~
that under the circumstances involved in this case, overriding
~••/
considerations of public safety justify the officer's failure to
~~~
· 1
provide Miranda warnings before he asked questions devoted to locating the abandoned weapon.
On September 11, 1980, at approximately 12:30 a.m., Officer Frank Kraft and Officer Sal Scarring were on road patrol
/in Queens, New York, when a young woman approached
.C~
~ their car. She told them that she had just been raped by a
~~
black male, approximately six feet tall, who was wearing a
~
}J 1,<j black jacket with the name "Big Ben" printed in yellow letLMA,..~
ters on the back. She told the officers that the man had just
lAJ-A~ ~
entered an A~ P supermarket located nearby and that the
,. ~.......- .. -,
ll ... ~n was carrying a gun .
.A ~~ .Y
The officers drove the woman to the supermarket, and Of, I
ficer Kraft entered the store while Officer Scarring radioed
/) -~ .6
for assistance. Officer Kraft quickly spotted respondent,
~
,, who matched the woman's description, approaching a check-
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out counter. Apparently upon seeing the officer, respondent
turned and ran toward the rear of the store, and Officer Kraft
pursued him with a drawn gun. When respondent turned
the corner at the end of an aisle, Officer Kraft lost sight of
him for approximately 15-20 seconds, and upon regaining
sight of respondent, ordered him to stop and put his hands
over his head.
Although more than three other officers had arrived on the
scene by that time, Officer Kraft was the first to reach respondent. He frisked him and discovered that he was wearing a shoulder holster which was then empty. After handcuffing him, Officer Kraft asked him where the gun was.
Respondent nodded in the direction of some empty cartons
and responded, "the gun is over there." Officer Kraft thereafter retrieved a loaded .38 caliber revolver from one of the
cartons, formally placed respondent under arrest, and read
him his Miranda rights from a printed card. Respondent indicated that he would be willing to answer questions without
an attorney present. Officer Kraft then asked respondent if
he owned the gun and where he had purchased it. Respondent answered that he did own it and that he had purchased it
in Miami, Florida.
In the subsequent prosecution of respondent for criminal
possession of a weapon, 1 the judge excluded the statement,
"the gun is over there," and the gun because the officer had
not given respondent the warnings required by our decision
in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), before asking
him where the gun was located. The judge excluded the
other statements about respondent's ownership of the gun
and the place of purchase, as evidence tainted by the prior
Miranda violation. The Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court of New York affirmed without opinion. 44 7 N. Y. S.
2d 84 (1981).
1
The state originally charged respondent with rape, but the record provides no information as to why the state failed to pursue that charge.
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The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed
by a 4-3 vote. 58 N. Y. 2d 664, 444 N. E. 2d 984 (1982). It
concluded that respondent was in "custody" within the meaning of Miranda during all questioning and rejected the state's
argument that the exigencies of the situation justified Officer
Kraft's failure to read respondent his Miranda rights until
after he had located the gun. The court declined to recognize an exigency exception to The usual requiremei)tS of
!J tranda because it" found no indication from Office
'
testimony at the suppression hearing that his ubjective
motivation in as · g_the_ question was to protect 1s~_own
safety or the safety of the public. 58 N. Y. 2d, at 666, 444
. E. 2 , a
5.
or the reasons which follow, we believe
that (his caWpresents a situation where concern for public
safety must be paramount to adherence to the literal langlligeor tfie proPJiYlaCtic rules enunciated in Miranda. ? ~~=--
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that "[n]o person . . .
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself." U. S. Const., Arndt. 5. In Miranda this Court
n.~P. for the first time extended the Fifth Amendment privilege
~ against compulsory self-incrimination to individuals sub~
l . ~ected to custodial interrogation by the police. 384 U. S., at
~.r·. 460-461, 467:-Tiie Fifth Amendment itself does not prohibit

ivA

~

2
We have long recognized an exigent circumstances exception to the
warrant requirement in the Fourth Amendment context. See, e. g.,
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 509 (1978); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S.
294, 298--300 (1967); Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14-15 (1948).
We have found the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment inapplicable in cases where the " 'exigencies of the situation' make the needs of
law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S.
385, 394 (1978), quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451, 456
(1948). Although "the Fifth Amendment's strictures, unlike the Fourth's,
are not removed by showing reasonableness,'.' Fisher v. United States, 425
U. S. 391, 400 (1976), we conclude today that there are limited circumstances where the judicially imposed strictures of Miranda are inapplica~
ble.

~4

~
~~4

<x?:::;:u-;~~
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all incriminating admissions; "[a]bsent some officially coerced
self-accusation, the Fifth Amendment privilege is not violated by even the most damning admissions." United States
v. Washington, 431 U. S. 181, 187 (1977) (emphasis added).
The Miranda Court, however, presumed that interrogation
in certain custodial circumstances 3 is inherently coercive and
held that statements made under those circumstances are inadmissible unless the suspect is specifically informed of his
Miranda rights and freely decides to forego those rights.
The prophylactic ~~ings therefore are "not themselves rights protected by t1ie (j'Qnstitution but [are] instead
measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination [is] protected." Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S.
433, 444 (1974); see Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477, 492
Requiring Miranda
(1981) (POWELL, J., concurring).
warnings before custodial interrogation provides "practical
reinforcement" for the Fifth Amendment right. Michigan
v. Tucker, supra, at 444.
In this case we have before us no ~1!1-im that respondent's
statements were actually 'com elled by polfc,e conduct which
overcame 1s WI to resist. See Beckwith v. United States,
425 U. S. 341, 347-348 (1976); Davis v. North Carolina, 384
U. S. 738 (1966). Thus the only issue before us is whether
Officer Kraft was justified in failing to make available to respondent the procedural gfegJiards associated with the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination since Miranda.
The New York Court of Appeals was undoubtedly corr~t
in deciding that the facts of this case come within the ambit of
the Miranda decision as we have subsequently interpreted it.

/

Miranda on its facts applies to station house questioning, but we have
not so limited it in our subsequent cases, often over strong dissent. See,
e. g., Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U. S. 291 (1980) (police car); Orozco v.
Texas, 394 U. S. 324 (1969) (defendant's bedroom); Mathis v. United
States, 391 U. S. 1 (1968) (prison cell during defendant's sentence for an
unrelated offense); but see Orozco v. Texas, supra, at 32S-331 (WHITE, J.,
dissenting) .
3

v

.1.

~

i,

f~
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We agree that respondent was in police custod{because we
have noted that "the ultimate'inquiry is simply whether there
is a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of
the degree associated with a formal arrest," California v.
Beheler,-- U.S.--,-- (1983) (per curiam), quoting
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam).
Here Quarles was surrounded by at least four police officers
and was handcuffed when the questioning at issue took place.
As the New York Court of Appeals observed, there was
nothing to suggest that any of the officers were any longer
concerned for their own physical safety. 58 N. Y.2d, at 666,
[ 444 N. E. 2d, at 985. The New York Court of Appeals' majority declined to express an opinion as to whether there
might be an exception to the Miranda rule if the police had
been acting to protect the public, because the lower courts in
New York had made no factual determination that the police
had acted with that motive. Ibid.
We hold that on these facts there is a "public safety" exception to the requirement that Miranda warnmgs""be gweno e:rofe a suspect's answers may be admitted into evidence, and
that the availability of that exception does not de end' upon
~e motivation o t
·n 1
liiY""oiveii. In ~7
lei oscop1c situation such as t e one co onting these offi- '
~here ' pontw ew rather than adherence to a police
manual is necessan y e order of the day, the application of
the exception which we recognize today should not be made
to depend on post hoc findings at a suppression hearing concerning the subjective motivation of the arresting officer. 4
'Similar approaches have been rejected in other contexts. See Rhode
Island v. Innis, supra, at 301 (officer's subjective intent to incriminate not
determinative of whether "interrogation" occurred); United States v. Men·
denhall, 446 U. S. 544, 554 & n. 6 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.) (officer's
subjective intent to detain not determinative of whether a "seizure" occurred within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); United States v.
Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, 236 & n. 7 (1973) (officer's subjective fear not determinative of necessity for "search incident to arrest" exception to the
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement).

·' .

i,
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Undoubtedly most police officers, if placed in Officer Kraft's
position, would act out of a host of different, instinctive, and
lar~ly unverifiable motives-their own safetY, the safetym
others, and pertiapsaswell the desire to obtain incrimmating
ev1aence from the suspect.
Whatever the motivation of individual officers in such a
A 0 ~ 'J , vutd-" situation, we do not believe that the doctrinal underpinnings
s
~J ?
of Miranda require that it be applied in all its rigor to a situafutAA +k~ ~
tion in which police officers ask questions easonably
~~ t..J:l
~ prompted by a concern for the public safety.
e Miranda
-/-~ ~
decision was based in large part on this Court's view that the
~ ~L 1... . ~ warnings which it required police to give to suspects in cus~
tody WOUld reduce the likelihood that the SUSpects WOUld fall
~ Gt. ~~ victim to constitutionally impermissible practices of police in+~
terrogation in the presumptively coercive environment of the
·
station house. 384 U. S. , at 455-458. The dissenters
warned that the requirement of Miranda warnings would
have the effect of decreasing the number of sus ect
spond to police questionin
d., at 504, 516-517 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). The Miranda majority, however, apparently
felt that whatever the cost to society in terms of fewer convictions of guilty suspects, that cost would simply have to be
borne in the interest of enlarged protection for the Fifth
Amendment privilege.
The police in this case, in the very act of apgrehen_illng a
~~ct, were confronted with the immediate neceSsitYoTaScertaining the wflereabo~ts _2.[ ~ which theytuldevery
reason t6 believe rii'e"suS'j)eCthid just removed from his
empty holster and discarded in the supermarket. So long as
the gun was concealed somewhere in the supermarket, with
its actual whereabouts unknown, it obviously posed more
than one danger to the public safety: an accomplice might
make use of it, a customer or employee might later come
upon it.
In such a situation, if the police are required to recite the
familiar Miranda warnings before asking the whereabouts of

. rCA

·

...,I

~

~
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the gun, suspects in Quarles' position might well be deterred
from responding. Procedural safeguards which deter a suspect from responding were deemed acceptable in Miranda in
order to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege; when the
primary social cost of those added protections is the possibility of fewer convictions, the Miranda majority was willing to
bear that cost. Here, had Miranda warnings deterred
Quarles from responding to Officer Kraft's question about the
whereabo-q.ts of the gun, the cost would have been something
AJ
"AJA. A--more than merely the failure to obtain evidence useful in con:
victing Quarles. Officer Kraft needed an answer to his ques-J ~ r,v "-- . . . .
tion not simply to make his case against Quarles but to insure ~} k
tM-u...j_t._
that further danger to the public did not result from the con- c._,.J-. -~ ~
cealment of t lie'-gun ih a pubhc a rea.
~ +tu_ ~
We conclude that the need for answers to questions in a
I ~?'- ~
~ck.J-~f----t---.Situatwn posmg iahreat to the public safety outweighs the
1
need for the prop~ylactic rule protecting the Fifth AmendLJ .S.V~ }t...o-.f- ~
ment's privilege against self-incrimination. We decline to
~'1 ~ ~
place officers such as Officer Kraft in the untenable position
I
"
of having to consider, often in a matter of seconds, whether it
~~ }
obest serves society for them to ask the necessary questions
~
without the Miranda warnings and render whatever probative evidence they uncover inadmissible, or for them to give
the warnings in order to preserve the admissibilty of evidence they might uncover but possibly damage or destroy
their ability to obtain that evidence and neutralize the volat"~~~~tile situation confronlJ
In recognizing a narro exc~pti to the Miranda rule i~l ~
this ease9, we ackno
t o some degree we lessen the
,
~'?
desirable clarity of that rule. At least in part in order to
~A p~ I
preserve its clarity, we have over the years refused to saneO-M. ~ (L,_~
tion attempts to expand our Miranda holding. See, e. g.,
~ u _ _ ._
~ ·
Minnesota v. Murphy,-- U. S. - - (1984) (refusal to ex'V'V'-#-CA.T 1o
tend Miranda requirements to interviews with probation of~"-c... ~c.....M.)
ficers); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U. S. 707 (1979) (refusal to
equate request to see a probation officer with request to see a

C
E

:\

ure
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lawyer for Miranda purposes); Beckwith v. United States,
425 U. S. 341 (1976) (refusal to extend Miranda requirements to questioning in non-custodial circumstances). As
we have in other contexts, we recognize here the importance
of a workable rule "to guide police officers, who have only
limited time aiid expertise to reflect on and balance the social
and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances
they confront." Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200,
213-214 (1979). But as we have pointed out, we believe that
the exception which we recognize today lessens the necessity
of that on-the-scene balancing process. The exception will
not be difficult for police officers to apply because in each case
it will be circumscribed by the exigency which justifies it.
We think police officers can and will distinguish almost instinctive! between ue ·ons necessary t o secure their own
safe y or the.Jafetjr ~t e py,blic an questions designed
sol ely t o eHCit testimoniaiev'tience i'rom a suspect.
The facts of this case clearly demonstrate that distinction
and an officer's ability to recognize it. Officer Kraft asked
only the question necessary to locate the missing gun before
advising respondent of his rights. It was only after securing
the loaded revolver and giving the warnings that he continued with investigatory questions about the ownership and
place of purchase of the gun. The M ceptiog which we recognize today, far from complicating e thought processes and
the on-the-scene judgments of police officers, will simply free
them to follow their legitimate instincts when confronting
situations presenting a danger to The public safety. 5
Although it involves police questions in part relating to the whereabouts of a gun, Orozco v. Texas, supra, is in no sense inconsistent with
our disposition of this case. In Orozco four hours after a murder had been
committed at a restaurant, four police officers entered the defendant's
boardinghouse and awakened the defendant, who was sleeping in his bedroom. Without giving him Miranda warnings, they began vigorously to
interrogate him about whether he had been present at the scene of the
shooting and whether he owned a gun. The defendant eventually admitted that he had been present at the scene and directed the officers to a
6

82-121~PINION

NEW YORK v. QUARLES

9

We hold that the Court of Appeals in this case erred in excluding the statement, "the gun is over there," and the gun
because of the officer's failure to read respondent his
Miranda rights before attempting to locate the weapon. Accordingly we hold that it also erred in excluding the subsequent statements as illegal fruits of a Miranda violation. 6
We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

washing machine in the backroom of the boardinghouse where he had hidden the gun. We held that all the statements should have been suppressed. In Orozco, however, the questions about the gun were clearly
investigatory; they did not in any way relate to an objectively reasonable
need to protect the police or the public from any immediate danger associated with the weapon. In short there was no exigency requiring immediate action by the officers beyond the normal need expeditiously to solve a
serious crime.
6
Because we hold that there is no violation of Miranda in this case, we
have no occasion to reach arguments made by the state and the United
States as amicus curiae that the gun is admissible either because it is nontestimonial or because the police would inevitably have discovered it absent their questioning.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 82-1213

NEW YORK v. BENJAMIN QUARLES
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OF NEW YORK
[May-, 1984]

JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in part in the judgment
and dissenting in part.
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), the Court
held unconstitutional, because inherently compelled, the admission of statements derived from in-custody questioning
not preceded by an explanation of the privilege against selfincrimination and the consequences of foregoing it. Today,
the Court concludes that overriding considerations of public
safety justify the admission of evidence-oral statements and
a gun-secured without the benefit of such warnings. Ante,
at 7. In so holding, the Court acknowledges that it is departing from prior precedent, see id., at 4, and that it is
"lessen[ing] the desirable clarity of [the Miranda] rule, id.,
at 7. Were the Court writing from a clean slate, I could
agree with its holding. But Miranda is now the law and, in
my view, the Court has not provided sufficient justification
for departing from it or for blurring its now clear strictures.
Accordingly, I would require suppression of the initial statement taken from respondent in this case. On the other
hand, nothing in Miranda or the privilege itself requires exclusion of nontestimonial evidence derived from informal custodial interrogation, and I tlierefore agree with the Court
that admission of the gun in evidence is proper. 1
As to the statements elicited after the Miranda warnings were administered, admission should turn solely on whether the answers received
1
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I

Prior to Miranda, the privilege against self-incrimination
had not been applied to an accused's statements secured during custodial police interrogation. In these circumstances,
the issue of admissibility turned, not on whether the accused
had waived his privilege against self-incrimination, but on
whether his statements were "voluntary" within the meaning
ofthe Due Process Clause. See, e. g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503 (1963); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U. S. 560
(1958); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227 (1940); Brown v.
Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936). Under this approach, the
"totality of the circumstances" were assessed. If the interrogation was deemed unreasonable or shocking, or if the
accused clearly did not have an opportunity to make a rational or intelligent choice, the statements received would be
inadmissible.
The Miranda Court for the first time made the Self-Incrimination Clause applicable to responses induced by informal custodial police interrogation, thereby requiring suppression of many admissions that, under traditional Due
Process principles, would have been admissible. More specifically, the Court held that:
"the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrowere voluntary. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 475 (1966). In
this case, the state courts made no express finding concerning the voluntariness of the statements made, because they thought the answers received had to be suppressed as "fruit" of the initial failure to administer
Miranda warnings. App. 43a-44a, 52a. Whether the mere failure to administer Miranda warnings can "taint" subsequent admissions is an open
question, compare United States v. Toral, 536 F. 2d 893, 896-897 (CA9
1976) with Oregon v. Elstad, 61 Ore. App. 673, 658 P. 2d 552 (1983), cert.
granted,- U. S . - (1984), but a proper inquiry must focus at least
initially, if not exclusively, on whether the subsequent confession is itself
free of actual coercion. See Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U. S. 596, 603
(1944). I would reverse and remand for further factual findings on this
issue.
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gation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of
procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege
against self-incrimination." Miranda v. Arizona,
supra, 384 U. S., at 444.
Those safeguards included the now familiar Miranda warnings-namely, that the defendant must be informed:
"that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he
says can be used against him in a court of law, that he
has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if
he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for
him prior to any questioning if he so desires." Id., at
479.

The defendant could waive these rights, but any waiver had
to be made "knowingly and intelligently," id., at 475, and the
burden was placed on the prosecution to prove that such a
waiver had voluntarily been made. Ibid. If the Miranda
warnings were not properly administered or if no valid
waiver could be shown, then all responses to interrogation
made by the accused "while in custody . . . or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way" were to
be presumed coerced and excluded from evidence at trial.
Id., at 476, 479.
The Miranda Court itself considered objections akin to
those raised by the Court today. In dissent, JusTICE
WHITE protested that the Miranda rules would "operate indiscriminately in all criminal cases, regardless of the severity
of the crime or the circumstances involved." I d., at 544.
But the Miranda Court would not accept any suggestion
"that society's need for interrogation [could] outweig[h] the
privilege." To that Court, the privilege against self-incrimination was absolute and therefore could not be "abridged."
Id., at 479.
Since the time Miranda was decided, the Court has repeatedly refused to bend the literal terms of that decision. To be
sure, the Court has been sensitive to the substantial burden

•'
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the Miranda rules place on local law enforcement efforts, and
consequently has refused to extend the decision or to increase its strictures on law enforcement agencies in almost
any way. See, e. g., California v. Beheler,-- U. S. - (1983) (per curiam); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492
(1977); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U. S. 341 (1976);
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U. S. 96 (1975); but cf. Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 (1981). Similarly, where "statements taken in violation of the Miranda principles [have] not
be[en] used to prove the prosecution's case at trial," the
Court has allowed evidence derived from those statements to
be admitted. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, 445 (1974).
But wherever an accused has been taken into "custody" and
subjected to "interrogation'.' without warnings, the Court has
consistently prohibited the use of his responses for prosecutorial purposes at trial. See, e. g., Estelle v. Smith, 451 U. S.
454 (1981); Orozco v. Texas, 394 U. S. 324 (1969); Mathis v.
United States, 391 U. S. 1 (1968); cf. Harris v. New York,
401 U. S. 222 (1971) (statements may be used for impeachment purposes). As a consequence, the "meaning of
Miranda has become reasonably clear and law enforcement
practices have adjusted to its strictures." Rhode Island v.
Innis, 446 U. S. 291, 304 (1980) (THE CHIEF JusTICE, concurring); see generally Stephens, Flanders, and Cannon,
Law Enforcement and the Supreme Court: Police Perceptions of the Miranda Requirements, 39 Tenn. L. Rev. 407
(1972).
In my viE:!W, a "public safety" exception unnecessarily blurs
the edges of the clear line heretofore established and makes
Miranda's requirements more difficult to understand. In
some cases, police will benefit because a reviewing court will
find that an exigency excused their failure to administer the
required warnings. But in other cases, police will suffer because, though they thought an exigency excused their noncompliance, a reviewing court will view the "objective" circumstances differently and require exclusion of admissions

I
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thereby obtained. The end result will be a finespun new
doctrine on public safety exigencies incident to custodial interrogation, complete with the hair-splitting distinctions that
currently plague our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
"While the rigidity of the prophylactic rules was a principal
weakness in the views of the dissenters and critics outside
the Court, ... that rigidity [has also been called a] strength
of the decision. It [has] afforded police and courts clear
guidance on the manner in which to conduct a custodial interrogation; if it was rigid, it was also precise .... [T]his core
virtue of Miranda would be eviscerated if the prophylactic
rules were freely [ignored] by ... courts under the guise" of
[reinterpreting] Miranda ....." Fare v. Michael C., 439
U. S. 1310, 1314 (1978) (REHNQUIST, J., in chambers on
application for stay).
The justification the Court provides for upsetting the equilibrium that has finally been achieved-that police cannot and
should not balance considerations of public safety against the
individual's interest in avoiding compulsory testimonial selfincrimination-really misses the critical question to be decided. See ante, at 7-8. Miranda has never been read to
prohibit the police from asking questions to secure the public
safety. Rather, the critical question Miranda addresses is
who shall bear the cost of securing the public safety when
such questions are asked and answered: the defendant or the
State. Miranda, for better or worse, found the resolution of
that question implicit in the prohibition against compulsory
self-incrimination and placed the burden on the State. When
police ask custodial questions without administering the required warnings, Miranda quite clearly requires that the answers received be presumed compelled and that they be excluded from evidence at trial. See Michigan v. Tucker,
supra, at 445, 447-448, 451, 452 and n. 26; Orozco v. Texas,
supra, at 326.
The Court concedes, as it must, both that respondent was
in "custody" and subject to "interrogation" and that his state-
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ment "the gun is over there" was compelled within the meaning of our precedent. See ante, at 4-5. In my view, since
there is nothing about an exigency that makes custodial interrogation any less compelling, a principled application of
Miranda requires that respondent's statement be suppressed.
II

The court below assumed, without discussion, that the
privilege against self-incrimination required that the gun derived from respondent's statement also be suppressed,
whether or not the State could independently link it to him. 2
That conclusion was, in my view, incorrect.
A

Citizens in our society have a deeply rooted social obligation "to give whatever information they may have to aid in
2

Respondent contends that the separate admissibility of the gun is not
preserved for our review. Brief for Respondent 45--51. This contention
is meritless. Respondent's motion to suppress and supporting affidavit
asked that the gun be excluded because it was obtained in contravention of
his privilege under the Fifth Amendment. See App. 5a, 7a-8a. The State
clearly opposed this motion, contending that admission of the statements
and the gun would not violate respondent's rights under the Constitution.
Id., at 9a. Both the Supreme Court of the State of New York and the
New York Court of Appeals required the gun, as well as the statements, to
be suppressed because respondent was not given the warnings to which
they thought he was constitutionally entitled. Id., at 43a (Supreme
Court); id., at 52a (Court of Appeals). The issue whether the failure to
administer warnings by itself constitutionally requires exclusion of the gun
was therefore clearly contested, passed on, and preserved for this Court's
review. See Illinois v. Gates,-- U.S.--,----- (1983).
Respondent also contends that, under New York law, there is an "independent and adequate state ground" on which the Court of Appeals' judgment can rest. Brief for Respondent 51-55. This may be true, but it is
also irrelevant. Both the trial and appellate courts of New York relied on
Miranda to justify exclusion of the gun; they did not cite or expressly rely
on any independent state ground in their published decisions. In these
circumstances, this Court has jurisdiction. See Michigan v. Long, - U. S. - , (1983).

J ~
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law enforcement." Miranda v. Arizona, supra, at 478.
Except where a recognized exception applies, "the criminal
defendant no less than any other citizen is obliged to assist
the authorities." Roberts v. United States, 445 U. S. 552,
558 (1980). The privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is one recognized exception, but it is an exception nonetheless. Only the introduction of a defendant's own testimony is proscribed by the Fifth Amendment's mandate that
no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U. S. Const., Arndt. 5. That mandate does not protect an accused from being compelled to surrender nontestimonial evidence against himself. See Fisher
v. United States, 425 U. S. 391, 408 (1976).
The distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial evidence was explored in some detail in Schmerber v. California, a decision this Court handed down within a week of deciding Miranda. See 384 U. S. 757 (1966). The defendant
in Schmerber had argued that the privilege against self-incrimination barred the state from coll}pelling him to submit
to a blood test, the results of which would be used to prove
his guilt at trial. The State, on the oth~r hand, had urged
that the privilege prohibited it only from compelling the accused to make a formal testimonial statement against himself
in an official legal proceeding. This Court rejected both positions. It favored an approach that protected the "accused
only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the state with evidence of a testimonial or
communicative nature." ld., at 761. The blood tests were
admissible because they were neither testimonial nor communicative in nature. ld., at 765.
In subsequent decisions, the Court relied on Schmerber in
holding the privilege inapplicable to situations where the accused was compelled to stand in a lineup and utter words that
allegedly had been spoken by the robber, see United States
v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 221-223 (1967), to provide handwriting samples, see Gilbert v. California, 388 U. S. 263, 26&-266
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(1967), and to supply voice exemplars. See United States v.
Dionisio, 410 U. S. 1, 5-7 (1973); see also United States v.
Mara, 410 U. S. 19, 21-22 (1973). "The distinction which
... emerged [in these cases], often expressed in different
ways, [was] that the privilege is a bar against compelling
'communications' or 'testimony,' but that compulsion which
makes a suspect or accused the source of 'real or physical evidence' does not violate it." Schmerber v. California, supra,
at 764.
B
The gun respondent was compelled to supply is clearly evidence of the "real or physical" sort. What makes the question of its admissibility difficult is the fact that, in asking respondent to produce the gun, the police also "compelled" him,
in the Miranda sense, to create an incriminating testimonial
response. In other words, the case is problematic because
police compelled respondent not only to provide the gun but
also to admit that he knew where it was and that it was his.
It is settled that Miranda did not itself determine whether
physical evidence obtained in this manner would be admissible. See Michigan v. Tucker, supra, 417 U. S., at 445-446,
447, 452 and n. 26. But the Court in Schmerber, with
Miranda fresh on its mind, did address the issue. In concluding that the privilege did not require suppression of compelled blood tests, the Court noted:
"This conclusion would not necessarily govern had the
State tried to show that the accused had incriminated
himself when told that he would have to be tested.
Such incriminating evidence may be an unavoidable byproduct of the compulsion to take the test, especially for
an individual who fears the extraction or opposes it on
religious grounds. If it wishes to compel persons to
submit to such attempts to discover evidence, the State
may have to forgo the advantage of any testimonial
products of administering the test-products which fall
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384 U. S., at 765, and n. 9 (em-

Thus, Schmerber resolved the dilemma by allowing admission
of the nontestimonial, but not the testimonial, products of the
State's compulsion.
·
The Court has applied this bifurcated approach in its subsequent cases as well. For example, in United States v.
Wade, where admission of a line-up identification was approved, the Court emphasized that no question was presented as to the admissibility of anything said or done at the
lineup. See 388 U. S. 218, 223 (1967). Likewise, in Michigan v. Tucker, where evidence derived from a technical
Miranda violation was admitted, the Court noted that no
statement taken without Miranda warnings was being admitted into evidence. See 417 U. S., at 445; cf. California v.
Byers, 402 U. S. 424, 431-433 (1971) (Opinion of BURGER,
C. J.). Thus, based on the distinction first articulated in
Schmerber, "a strong analytical argument can be made for an
intermediate rule whereby[,] although [the police] cannot require a suspect to speak by punishment or force, the non-testimonial [evidence derived] from speech that is [itself] excludable for failure to comply with the Miranda code could still be
used." H. Friendly, Benchmarks, p. 280 (1967). ·
To be sure, admission of nontestimonial evidence secured
through informal custodial interrogation will reduce the incentives to enforce the Miranda code. But that fact simply
begs the question of how much enforcement is appropriate.
There are some situations, as the Court's struggle to accommodate a "public safety" exception demonstrates, in which
the societal cost of administering the Miranda warnings is
very high indeed. 3 The Miranda decision quite practically
3

The most obvious example, first suggested by Judge Henry Friendly,
involves interrogation directed to the discovery and termination of an ongoing criminal activity such as kidnapping or extortion. See Friendly,
The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 Calif. L. Rev. 929,
949 (1965).

t.,·,
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does not express any societal interest in having those warnings administered for their own sake. Rather, the warnings
and waiver are only required to ensure that "testimony" used
against the accused at trial is voluntarily given. Therefore,
if the testimonial aspects of the accused's custodial communications are suppressed, the failure to administer the Miranda
warnings should cease to be of concern. Cf. Weatherford v.
Bursey, 429 U. S. 545 (1977) (where interference with assistance of counsel has no affect on trial, no Sixth Amendment
violation lies). The harm caused by failure to administer
Miranda warnings relates only to admission of testimonial
self-incriminations, · and the suppression of such incriminations should by itself produce the optimal enforcement of the
Miranda rule.

c

There are, of course, decisions of this Court which suggest
that the privilege against self-incrimination requires suppression of not only compelled statements but also of all evidence
derived therefrom. See, e. g., Maness v. Meyers, 419 U. S.
449 (1975); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441 (1972);
McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U. S. 34 (1924); Counselman v.
Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 (1892). In each of these cases,
however, the Court was responding to the dilemma that confronts persons asserting their Fifth Amendment privilege to
a court or other tribunal vested with the contempt power.
In each instance, the tribunal can require witnesses to appear
without any showing of probable cause to believe they have
committed an offense or that they have relevant information
to convey, and require the witnesses to testify even if they
have formally and expressly asserted a privilege of silence.
Individuals in this situation are faced with what Justice Goldberg once described as "the cruel trilemma of self-accusation,
perjury, or contempt." Murphy v. Waterfront Commission,
378 U. S. 52, 55 (1964).
If the witness' invocation of the
privilege at trial is not to be defeated by the State's refusal to
let him remain silent at an earlier proceeding, the witness has
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to be protected "against the use of [his] compelled answers
and evidence derived therefrom in any subsequent criminal
case ... ."Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U. S. 70, 78 (1973).
By contrast, suspects subject to informal custodial police
interrogation of the type involved in this case are not in the
same position as witnesses required to appear before a court,
grand jury, or other such formal tribunal. Where independent evidence leads police to a suspect, and probable cause justifies his arrest, the suspect cannot seriously urge that the
police have somehow unfairly infringed on his right "to a private enclave where he may lead a private life." Murphy v.
Waterfront Commission, supra, at 55. Moreover, when a
suspect interjects not the privilege itself but a post hoc complaint that the police failed to administer Miranda warnings,
he invokes only an irrebuttable presumption that the interrogation was coercive. He does not show that a privilege was
raised and that the police actually or overtly coerced him to
provide testimony and other evidence to be used against him
at trial. See Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U. S. 719, 730
(1966). He could have remained silent and the interrogator
could not have punished him for refusing to speak. Indeed,
the accused is in the unique position of seeking the protection
of the privilege without having timely asserted it. Cf.
United States v. Kordel, 397 U. S. 1, 10 (1970) (failure to assert waives right to complain about testimonial compulsion).
The person in police custody surely may sense that he is in
"trouble," Oregon v. Hass, 420 U. S. 714, 722 (1975), but he
is in no position to protest that he faced the Hobson's choice
of self-accusation, perjury, or contempt. He therefore has a
much less sympathetic case for obtaining the benefit of a
broad suppression ruling. See Michigan v. Tucker, supra,
at 444-451; cf. New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U. S. 450, 458-459
(1979).
Indeed, whatever case can be made for suppression evaporates when the statements themselves are not admitted,
given the rationale of the Schmerber line of cases. Certainly
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interrogation which provides leads to other evidence does not
offend the values underlying the Fifth Amendment privilege
any more than the compulsory taking of blood samples, fingerprints, or voice exemplars, all of which may be compelled
in an "attempt to discover evidence that might be used to
prosecute [a defendant] for a criminal offense." Schmerber
v. California, supra, at 761. Use of a suspect's answers
"merely to find other evidence establishing his connection
with the crime [simply] differs by only a shade from the permitted use for that purpose of his body and blood." H.
Friendly, supra, p. 280. The values underlying the privilege
may justify exclusion of an unwarned person's out-of-court
statements, as perhaps they may justify exclusion of statements and derivative evidence compelled under the threat of
contempt. But when the only evidence to~ be admitted is derivative evidence such as a gun-derived not from actual
compulsion but from a statement taken in the absence of
Miranda warnings-those values simply cannot require suppression, at least no more so than they would for other such
nontestimonial evidence. 4
• In suggesting that Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963),
requires exclusion of the gun, see post, at 15-16, JusTICE MARSHALL fails
to acknowledge this Court's holding in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433,
445-446 (1974). In Tucker, the Court very clearly held that Wong Sun is
inapplicable in cases involving mere departures from Miranda. Wong
Sun and its "fruit of the poisonous tree" analysis lead to exclusion of derivative evidence only where the underlying police misconduct infringes a
"core" constitutional right. See id. Failure to administer Miranda warnings violates only a nonconstitutional prophylactic. Ibid.
Nix v. Williams,-- U. S. - - (1984), is not to the contrary. In Nix,
the Court held that evidence which inevitably would have been discovered
need not be excluded at trial because of independent police misconduct.
The Court in Nix discusses Wong Sun and its "fruit of the poisonous tree"
analysis only to show that, even assuming a "core" violation of the Fourth,
Fifth, or Sixth Amendment, evidence with a separate causal link need not
be excluded at trial. Thus, Nix concludes that only "where 'the subsequent trial [cannot] cure a[n otherwise] one-sided confrontation between
prosecuting authorities and the uncounseled defendant,'" id, at - -
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On the other hand, if a suspect is subject to abusive police
practices and actually or overtly compelled to speak, it is reasonable to infer both an unwillingness to speak and a perceptible assertion of the privilege. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437
U. S. 385, 396-402 (1978). Thus, when the Miranda violation consists of a deliberate and flagrant abuse of the
accused's constitutional rights, amounting to a denial of due
process, application of a broader exclusionary rule is warranted. Of course, "a defendant raising [such] a coercedconfession claim must first prevail in a voluntariness hearing
before his confession and evidence derived from it [will] become inadmissible." Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S.
441, 462 (1972). By contrast, where the accused proves only
that the police failed to administer the Miranda warnings,
exclusion of the statement itself is all that will and should be
required. 5 Limitation of the Miranda prohibition to testimonial use of the statements themselves adequately serves
the purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination.

III
In Miranda, the Court looked to the experience of countries like England, India, Scotland, and Ceylon in developing
its code to regulate custodial interrogations. See Miranda
v. Arizona, supra, 384 U. S., at 486-489. Those countries
had also adopted procedural rules to regulate the manner in
which police secured confessions to be used against accused
(quoting from United States v. Ash, 413 U. S. 300, 315 (1973)), should derivative evidence be excluded. Cf. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387,
406--407 and n. 12 (1977) (leaving open question whether any evidence beyond the incriminating statements themselves must be excluded); Massiah
v. United States, 377 U. S. 201, 207 (1964) (same).
6
Respondent has not previously contended that his confession was so
blatantly coerced as to constitute a violation of due process. He has argued only that police failed to administer Miranda warnings. He has
proved, therefore, only that his statement was presumptively compelled.
In any event, that is a question for the trial court on remand to decide in
the first instance, not for this Court to decide on certiorari review.
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persons at trial. See Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 935, 1090-1114 (1966). Confessions
induced by trickery or physical abuse were never admissible
at trial, and any confession secured without the required procedural safeguards could, in the courts' discretion, be excluded on grounds of fairness or prejudice. See Gotlieb,
Confirmation by Subsequent Facts, 72 L. Q. Rev. 209,
223-224 (1956). But nontestimonial evidence derived from
all confessions "not blatantly coerced" was and still is admitted. H. Friendly, supra, p. 282; see also Commissioners of
Customs and Excise v. Harz, 1 All Eng. Rep. 177, 182
(1967); The King v. Warickshall, 168 Eng. Rep. 234 (1783).
Admission of nontestimonial evidence of this type is based on
the very sensible view that procedural errors should not
cause entire investigations and prosecutions to be lost. See
Enker and Elsen, Counsel For the Suspect: M assiah v.
United States and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 Minn. L. Rev. 47,
80 (1964).

The learning of these countries was important to development of the initial Miranda rule. It therefore should be of
equal importance in establishing the scope of the Miranda
exclusionary rule today. 6 I would apply that learning in this
case and adhere to our precedents requiring that statements
elicited in the absence of Miranda warnings be suppressed.
But because nontestimonial evidence such as the gun should
not be suppressed, I join in that part of the Court's judgment
that reverses and remands for further proceedings with the
gun admissible as evidence against the accused.

6
Interestingly, the trend in these other countries is to admit the improperly obtained statements themselves, if nontestimonial evidence later
corroborates, in whole or in part, the admission. See Development in the
Law-Confessions, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 935, 1094-1095, 1100, 1104,
1108-1109 (1966); see also The Queen v. Ramasamy, [1965] A. C. 1, 12-15
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